

# Patient Safety in the OR and the *Normalization of Deviance*

Stephen D. Parker, MD, MBA  
Washington Hospital Center

# Background

- Anesthetic related mortality has improved significantly over the past 3 decades
  - Increase in older patients with more concurrent disease having more complex procedures
  - Only specialty where malpractice premiums have *decreased* since the 1980s
- Further progress may be undermined by organizational culture that fails to make patient safety the first priority



# Lessons from Space

- 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Apollo 13 mission
- NASA's finest hour in crisis management
  - See the movie if you are too young to remember the event!
- NASA helped create CRM with the airline industry in 1979
  - Avoidance, trapping, and mitigation of risk
    - Landing of flight 1549 on Hudson River 1/09



First Class: Life Raft Included

Coach: No Raft, No Preservers

# Lessons from Space

- Why did NASA continue to operate the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 when O-ring erosion problems were well known and documented prior to the launch?
- Why was the shuttle Columbia launched when it was known that foam insulation was breaking off and hitting vulnerable parts of the vehicle during ascent?

## **The Normalization of Deviance: Do We (Un)Knowingly Accept Doing the Wrong Thing?**

Richard C. Prielipp, MD, MBA, FCCM,\* Maria Magro, CRNA, MS, MSN,† Robert C. Morell, MD,‡  
and Sorin J. Brull, MD§

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Vaughan D. The Challenger Launch Decision. Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA. Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press, 1996

# *Normalization of Deviance*

- “A gradual erosion of normal procedures that would never be tolerated if proposed in one single, abrupt leap.”
- Incremental deviations are observed, tolerated (if no accident) → become “normalized”
- Safety violations are seen as technical violations that can be tolerated and managed, undermining the “culture” of safety

# Human Factors and Anesthesia Mishaps

- Poor communication, stress and fatigue, inadequate provider experience and/or supervision, afferent overload/situational awareness, normalcy bias (assuming alarms are false positives)
- Production pressure
- Normalization of Deviance

# Production Pressure

- Ever increasing health care costs
- Doing “more with less”
- Improving OR efficiency, fine tuning the economic engine of the hospital
  - Improving first case starts
  - Improving turnover time between cases
  - Doing more cases during prime time

## Practices that should not be “normalized”

- Removing monitors at the end of general anesthesia before the patient is responsive, extubated, and hemodynamically stable
- Handoffs of care at vital times (induction, emergence, critical points in the case)
- Failure to follow recognized isolation policies and procedures

## Practices that should not be “normalized”

- Failure to wash hands before and after patient contact
- Failure to examine preop testing data before surgery
- Excessive noise in the OR during induction and at other critical points in the case

## Practices that should not be “normalized”

- Failure to place standard monitors before performing a peripheral nerve block
- Titration of narcotics in the PACU by rigid adherence to pain score, without modulation based on clinical judgment
- **Failure to monitor the effect of neuromuscular blocking drugs in every patient receiving them**  
**Inadequate knowledge, inadequate technology, false sense of security with newer agents**

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## EDITORIAL III

# Risk management, NASA, and the National Health Service: lessons we should learn

K. J. Fong\*

Department of Anaesthesia, University College Hospital, Euston Road, London NW1 2BU, UK

\* E-mail: kevin.fong@uclh.nhs.uk

# What to do?

- Create a culture where safety is always the primary objective: “*Primum non nocere*”
  - Beware of the temptation to cut corners to improve throughput – the gains will be marginal at best
  - Confront and correct “normalization of deviance” when you see it in your environment
  - Beware of “faster, cheaper, better”

# What to do?

- Don't be fooled into thinking "I got away with it, so it must be OK"
  - Rule of 3
- Don't demand evidence that accepting more risk will harm the patient, demand evidence that more risk will *not harm* the patient

From the patient's/family's perspective

1. Don't Hurt Me
2. Heal me
3. Be nice to me

*...in this order*



SAFETY + Quality + Satisfaction = Exceptional Care

